2.Around 18 months ago, people close to Radrizzani began asking the question of how much further he could feasibly take the club. He was wealthy, undoubtedly, but not at the obscene level needed to drive a Premier League team on year after year. The division required an inordinate amount of cash and, though Radrizzani had talked publicly about future growth — a new city-centre training ground, major redevelopment of Elland Road, staying on as majority shareholder until Leeds qualified for Europe — their struggle through the 2021-22 season cast doubt over the likelihood of any of that happening.
Criticism from the fanbase of him and Leeds’ stagnation grew and Radrizzani, a regular Twitter user, was acutely aware of it, keen for greater popularity or validation. Though some who worked with him would suggest that he come off the social media site or at least refrain from posting too much, he had a habit of tweeting in ways that aggravated the support. Last summer saw a shift in transfer policy too. Whereas in previous windows Leeds had made new signings without sanctioning major departures, this time they sold Kalvin Phillips and Raphinha for a combined total of close to £100million to finance their recruitment. “We cannot do another three years spending another £100million without any (transfer) income,” Radrizzani told The Athletic last August. Financially, they had their limits.

In terms of annual revenue, Leeds were consistently in a healthy position. In the 2021-22 financial year, their turnover reached a record £189million. But while that money covered a lot of their day-to-day costs, the view internally was that a minimum of £30m to £40m was needed via additional shareholder injections to allow for sufficient transfer activity. It was that which encouraged the feeling that, if Leeds were to progress, Radrizzani would have to relinquish them to 49ers Enterprises. The US fund, which was pulling together investors in the States, had the capacity to plough in more cash. And overall losses of £34million in the 2021-22 season showed how much a Premier League outfit swallowed.
Moreover, on the football front it was not going well at all. Leeds’ position as a competitive team under Bielsa had crumbled and neither the appointment of subsequent head coaches nor recruitment guided by Orta arrested the slide. Radrizzani was bullish at the start of this term, saying he expected Leeds to finish between 10th and 14th place. By the afternoon of a 4-1 defeat at Bournemouth last month, the final game of Gracia’s reign, he was describing himself in a Twitter message to a fan as “broken”. “I am responsible for this ****,” the message read. “Unacceptable. You don’t deserve this. Ridiculous.”

It is five years since 49ers Enterprises first came on the scene at Leeds, making an initial investment in 2018, but its intentions became more serious in 2021 when it upped its stake to 44 per cent and agreed an option to buy Radrizzani out in full, with a deadline of January 2024. Though the group sought complete control, it was mindful of not disrespecting Radrizzani or being seen to push him out prematurely. Then, in the early part of this season, 49ers Enterprises made it clear that it was ready to do the deal sooner. But it was aware of financial liabilities waiting down the line, some comprising of future payments owed for transfers, and it was not willing to pay quite as much as had been agreed in the 2024 option, one which valued Leeds at just under £500million.
In November, around the time of the World Cup, one member of the investment group was indicating that a transfer of ownership could happen before the end of the January transfer window but as time passed, there was no movement. The situation was complicated by the team’s second battle with relegation. In the EFL, 49ers Enterprises reckoned that Leeds would be worth closer to £150million than £500million, based on the drop in revenue they would suffer. At most, it would pay just under £170million. It was not prepared to finalise a takeover without relegation contingencies and an impasse developed, making the January window complicated. Every transfer involved negotiations about how precisely it would be funded. Orta, by then of the view that a takeover was essential, grew more and more frustrated with how slowly certain negotiations moved. A vacuum of leadership developed.
Georginio Rutter’s arrival from Hoffenheim was one example. Radrizzani mooted the idea of taking Rutter on loan with an obligation to buy at the end of the season but 49ers Enterprises wanted a permanent transfer immediately and a protracted move was done for £30million. Radrizzani favoured selling Jack Harrison to Leicester City, a means of raising around £20million, but 49ers Enterprises preferred to retain him and the move collapsed less than two hours before the deadline, despite Harrison being sent to Leicester’s training ground just in case. Events like those made the point that the split of ownership at boardroom level was not sustainable indefinitely.

Through further talks, Radrizzani and 49ers Enterprises got themselves a point where contracts were in place to allow a full takeover to go ahead this summer, contingent on Leeds avoiding relegation. Up until the 45th minute of the club’s game against Crystal Palace on April 9, it looked like they would do so. Leeds led 1-0 and were on course to move onto 32 points with eight games to play. They conspired to lose 5-1 by falling apart in the second half and had Radrizzani turned up in the directors’ box for today’s clash with Spurs, he would have been staring at a team who were stuck on 31 and as good as down. In the timeline of decline, it was a huge Sliding Doors moment.
On the Sunday of the Palace defeat, the marketing department at Elland Road were preparing for an announcement the following week. Leeds had been invited to join a pre-season Premier League tournament in the US and the six-team line-up for the event was about to be unveiled. But Leeds lost to Palace, the governing body got cold feet about whether Leeds would even be a Premier League team come July and, within 24 hours of the game, promptly replaced them with Fulham. Leeds were on the road to the Championship and would not get off it.