O/T:- Trump

[Jampie]

Since the topic of the US, Russia, Ukraine and NATO seems to be prominent in this thread, I highly recommend this article that came out today. I find that the author, who goes by a pseudonym, is consistently thoughtful in his analysis:

https://open.substack.com/pub/bigser...m_medium=email

Yeah not a bad read, thanks for posting. I find myself in broad agreement on a lot of points with some reservations... until his conclusions.

I think he's largely right where he says NATO had no plan from basically the fall of the USSR up until now - and indeed no western military has had a truly coherent plan in that time.

But I don't think he completely understands the nature of NATO expansion, or the strategy (such as it is) in Ukraine and with rearmament.

First, expansion. NATO's expansion was (as he correctly surmises) not driven by a brilliant plan of any kind, least of all one to "provoke" Russia or even to "contain" Russia. NATO's expansion was primarily driven by the now new member states wanting to join, for the very good reason that Putin does indeed intend to re-form the USSR under a new banner, as he has now shown the world with his own "brilliant plan" in Ukraine.

Which brings me to the Ukraine "strategy". Clearly we are looking at an exercise in deliberate stalemate. I say that because the west has consistently dragged its feet with critical weapons and supplies, always giving Ukraine enough to resist Russian advances, but never enough to push them back (with some very notable exceptions in the first 18 months of the war).

I believe this is because the west sees this conflict as a strategic stalemate. It's absolutely the case that we are unwilling to risk a nuclear confrontation, which means sending in NATO troops is ruled out unless Russia uses nukes or attacks NATO directly. And it's absolutely true that part of the analysis is that arming Ukraine has massively degraded the conventional threat Russia posed in January 2022. Ugly as that calculus is, there's no way western leaders haven't been shown that particular graph.

Lastly with respect to re-armament, clearly NATO states see it as a priority, but not an urgent one. Defence spending has massively increased, but yes they are looking at the long term. Not seeing, for example, a land with against Russia in 2025 or 2026 as something to prepare for. There's a few different reasons for that. One is that yes, western military strategy is often terrible, and that's a big part of it. We might be buying the wrong stuff at the wrong time. We often do. But the bigger component is that while NATO has been shaken out of (the worst of) its complacency by the Ukraine war, at the same time we have witnessed the supposed threat fall flat on its face with appalling losses of equipment and personnel. As mentioned, Russia is sitting on about 20% of Ukrainian territory in July 2024. They were also sitting on about 20% of Ukrainian territory in July 2022. The war isn't progressing - at all - for either side.

Which brings me to the Russian strategy, or I should say the Putin strategy, because this is where I think Serge really misses the point. Putin has also adopted a strategy of deliberate stalemate for the time being. He hasn't implemented the universal conscription or 100% war economy he would need to, to actually win the war. Why not? It may be he fears it might be the end of him politically, or more likely (IMO) he has a better plan.

And also IMO and based on all available evidence, that plan is absolutely Donald Trump, who has quite directly stated that if elected again he will force the Ukrainians to end the war on Russian terms. Yeah, he didn't phrase it like that, but that's what he said. There is no way to bring this conflict to a close rapidly without giving Russia everything they demand (because they are the aggressor), and he's committed to doing exactly that.

Trump's role (for Putin) is also the disablement of NATO. Either pulling the US out, or refusing to commit to article 5 in the case of, for example, a Latvian adventure.

When Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 I was honestly shocked. Not because I didn't expect him to attack westwards. I did. I just expected him to attack a NATO member, one of the weaker ones (Latvia's a decent example), and I expected him to do it while Trump was in charge. However, based on the evidence, I don't think Putin expected Trump to lose in 2020. He just wasn't prepared for it, and that's a key factor that lead him to attack Ukraine instead of a much weaker (but NATO) target.

The last point I will make, and I know you have no faith in this but I see it as well established fact at this point. There is a massive technological gap between NATO equipment and Russian equipment, and this plays heavily into NATO and broader western strategic thinking. While the Ukraine war has showcased that offset to a large extent, it's also obscured key components. The most relevant of which is western air power, and I think the world's general population would be absolutely shocked to realise the capability difference there.

Russian military research largely ground to a halt at the end of the cold war. At that point it was already behind, but nothing like the gap we see today. However, from that point until today, Russia has spent a tiny fraction of what the west does on military research and development, and the capability gaps have consistently widened.

As a result, I would expect a full scale conventional war between NATO and Russia to:

1) Be shockingly one-sided in NATO's favour. Especially the air war, followed by the ground war with air superiority for NATO
2) To go nuclear not long after starting, because Putin will face a choice between defeat and nuclear war

So... this will also be feeding into NATO strategy, and especially Biden's. A conventional war with Russia is to be avoided if possible. Not because we would lose, but because we would all lose.